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Abstract
In environments with no commitment and with a need for intertemporal
trade, bounded recall is shown to be a su±cient friction for a receipt system (¯at
money) to lead to improved allocations in an otherwise frictionless Walrasian
model. The absence of other frictions makes price determination tractable, thus
the model may be used for quantitative monetary policy experiments. Some
issues regarding the divisibility of money are also discussed.
¤We thank, without implicating in any way, B. Ravikumar and Narayana Kocherlakota for com-
ments and discussions. All errors are ours.
1I INTRODUCTION
Recent work by Kocherlakota (1998) identi¯es \lack of public memory" as a neces-
sary friction for money to be essential in a variety of models. By essential we mean,
as is standard, that monetary equilibria support allocations that are Pareto superior
to the best supportable allocations in the absence of money. His study includes the
overlapping generations and the search models of money.1 These models typically
involve a number of other frictions that are often considered necessary for money to
be essential. For example, as it is well known since the work of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), in addition to lack of public memory, the search model assumes bilateral meet-
ings, random matching, and, of course, lack of commitment. While these frictions
are su±cient for money to be essential in this model, there is no formal claim that
each of them is indeed necessary. A similar statement can be made for other existing
monetary models.
In this paper, we study the question of what is a minimal departure from the
frictionless Walrasian model that provides an essential role for money in the sense
de¯ned above. Of course, one can depart from the Walrasian world in many di®erent
ways, and we shall not argue that such a minimal departure can be accomplished in a
unique way. Nevertheless, we believe that the question is worth pursuing. From the
theoretical point of view, identifying a minimal set of frictions that are su±cient for
money to arise is important in order to understand what exactly money is a substitute
for. From a more applied point of view, one would always like to dispose, if possible,
of frictions that do not resemble what is going on in the actual economy, especially if
this can lead to more tractable models.
Our analysis demonstrates that in environments where there is su±cient need for
1Standard references on these monetary models include Wallace (1980), Kiyotaki and Wright
(1991), and Wallace (1997).
2intertemporal trade and no commitment, incomplete recollection of past transac-
tions, which we shall refer to as imperfect recall, is by itself su±cient for money to
be essential. Furthermore, we argue that imperfect recall can be incorporated to the
Walrasian paradigm. That lack of commitment is not inconsistent with competitive
analysis has been used, for example, by Kehoe and Levine (1993), who de¯ne compet-
itive equilibria and demonstrate versions of the welfare theorems in economies with
individual rationality constraints.2 Regarding record keeping, we adopt a benchmark
that represents an opposite extreme from the standard Walrasian model. We assume
that in any given period, agents or, alternatively, the Walrasian auctioneer, cannot
recall past trades. E®ectively, this leads to an additional individual rationality con-
straint in the standard sequential markets model: agents will never agree to trades
that make them worse o® than their endowment allocation during any given period.
In Appendix 1 we discuss how this individual rationality constraint can be derived
as a property of any equilibrium outcome of a game between agents with no recall of
the past and their future selves.
Kehoe and Levine consider a world of limited liability in which participation con-
straints ensure that agents are at no time better o® reverting to permanent autarky.
In our setup, the lack of recall of past trades requires that agents are at no time
better o® reverting to autarky for that period. Of course, the interesting cases are
the ones between the two extremes of perfect recall and complete lack of recall, and
ultimately the degree of the incompleteness of record keeping can be formulated as a
quantitative question.
We start our analysis by presenting an intertemporal competitive endowment econ-
omy in which repeated borrowing and lending is necessary for desirable allocations to
2Other, more recent, references include Alvarez and Jermann (1996) and Kocherlakota (1996).
As the statement about the ¯rst welfare theorem indicates, this setup does not readily provide a
role for money.
3be supported. With no recall of past trades, however, the only reasonable outcome in
this economy will imply no intertemporal trades. On the other hand, useless pieces of
paper may be valued playing, in a sense, the role of receipts, indicating that certain
transfers of goods took place in the past. For the purposes of our analysis, we re-
strict ourselves to the case where money consists of intrinsically useless and perfectly
storable ¯at objects. We show that such objects lead to improved allocations over
the best allocations that can be supported in the absence of money; in other words,
we show that money is essential. Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the
model from increased divisibility of money.3
One might wonder whether lack of commitment alone is su±cient for money to
be essential in our setup. The answer, in general, is no. Under perfect recall, there
exist simple mechanisms that guarantee \good behavior" by triggering a collective
punishment, say, permanent autarky, if anyone has misbehaved in the past. Such
punishments might work even if the identity of the deviator is not known. Imper-
fect recall limits the applicability of such punishments. It is worth mentioning that
although here we restrict ourselves to a standard endowment competitive economy,
our point is quite general. In the absence of commitment, in any setup in which
information about the past is relevant in determining allocations, and in which recall
is imperfect, the existence of ¯at objects may lead to superior outcomes by revealing
past trades; i.e., by acting as a receipt system. This would be true, for example, in
a dynamic insurance economy like the one in Green (1987), or in a game theoretic
setup, such as a repeated market game. One advantage of dealing with a competitive
model is that the determination of prices is straightforward.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the environment without money.
Section III studies competitive monetary equilibrium. Section IV deals with monetary
injections. In Section V we introduce an extension of the basic model to perfectly
3See Kocherlakota (1999) for a discussion of this issue within a search model of money.
4divisible money. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. In Appendix 1 we deal
with the derivation of the individual rationality constraint. Appendix 2 contains
some proofs.
II THE ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT MONEY
Time is discrete and the horizon is in¯nite; t = 1;2;:::. There is one non-storable,
perfectly divisible good per period. We consider an endowment economy populated
by a ¯nite number, i = 1;::: ;I, of types of in¯nitely lived agents. There is one agent
(alternatively, a continuum of measure 1 of agents) per type.4 Each agent receives
a positive endowment of the consumption good in each period, ei
t, and fei
tgt denotes
agent i's in¯nite sequence of endowments. Let u(ct) denote the period utility function
from consumption. We assume that u is smooth, monotonically increasing and strictly
concave. Agents discount the future at rate ¯ 2 (0;1). There is no uncertainty.
If this were a standard competitive economy, Walrasian equilibrium could be char-
acterized in a straightforward fashion. Of course, given that no frictions have been
introduced thus far, money could play no welfare-improving role. The approach
taken here is quite di®erent. We assume that there is no commitment and that no
past trades can be recalled, therefore, allocations in any given period cannot depend
on past trades. To guarantee that past trades cannot be reconstructed, we assume
that agents cannot recall the utility from their past consumption.
Assumption 1: For all t, agents do not recall trades or utilities from periods
0;::: ;t ¡ 1.
Needless to say, the assumption of no recall of the past is extreme and versions of
all our results can be derived under less extreme versions of imperfect recall of the
4The basic results throughout the paper generalize to the case where there are many types and
to the case where there are many goods.
5past. As mentioned earlier, we shall adopt the no recall case as a benchmark.5
Remark 1 Assumption 1 leads us to impose the constraint that u(ci
t) ¸ u(ei
t), 8i, 8t.
In the absence of money, what would be a reasonable outcome in such a world?
Let li
t stand for one-period lending (borrowing if negative) of agent i in period t, and
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A sequential markets equilibrium is an in¯nite sequence of period interest rates, lend-
ing, and consumptions such that given interest rates, the consumers' choices solve the
above problem, and markets clear. Notice that the individual's problem is identical to
the standard sequential markets setup, but with the additional individual rationality
(IR) constraint that since there is no recall, no individual will lend in exchange for
higher future consumption. While the IR constraint seems intuitive, it consists of a
reduced way to capture the no recall assumption, and one would like to derive it from
primitives. In Appendix 1, we construct a game that agents play against both other
agents and their \future selves." In each period, agents choose their lending and their
reports on past lending after having formed beliefs about future actions. We argue
that all sequential equilibria of that game satisfy the IR constraint in problem (1).
5One could argue that some of the frictions in existing monetary models (say, random matching
or turnpike assumptions (Townsend (1980)) are made in order to justify the lack of recall of past
actions. Our response is that imperfect recall is neither logically implied by these frictions nor does
it imply any of them. Using money in our model will be akin to the use of poker chips. Poker players
use them to summarize the outcomes of past rounds.
6Restricting attention to one period lending is without loss of generality.
6While in the case where there are many goods trades could take place within the
period as in the standard Walrasian model, the absence of recall will prevent any
borrowing or lending. In the case studied here, where there is only one consump-
tion good per period, this will lead to autarky since no intertemporal trades will be
realized. This is summarized in the following.
Proposition 1 In the absence of money, there are no intertemporal trades in equi-
librium.
As mentioned earlier, the assumption of no recall de¯nes one extreme. In general,
we could assume that agents have perfect recall of the last T periods, where T < t.
In that case, intertemporal trades that involve less than T period lending will be
executed as in the standard Walrasian model. We introduce money next.
III COMPETITIVE MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM
Here we introduce money into the model. Partly in order to establish a connection
between our ¯ndings to those of the random matching model, and partly because
we view the degree of divisibility of money as an interesting policy variable, we shall
assume that money consists of indivisible, perfectly storable ¯at objects. Later, we
study a version of the model with perfectly divisible money. For convenience, we
study a special case with two (types of) agents, I = f1;2g, and one consumption
good per period.7 To generate a need for intertemporal trade, we assume that each
(type of) agent always receives a low endowment after a high endowment, and a
high endowment after a low endowment. Let e1
t, e2
t represent agent (type) 1's and
2's endowment in period t, respectively. Without loss of generality, suppose agent 1





7Our analysis easily extends to the case of many types, and the case of many goods under the
assumption of CES preferences.





For concreteness, let the agents' endowment sequences be e1 = feh;el;eh;el;:::g
and e2 = fel;eh;el;eh;:::g, with eh > el > 0. In addition, assume that agent (type)
2 is endowed with one unit of intrinsically useless, perfectly storable, indivisible ¯at
object in period 1. Informally, since trade corresponds to borrowing and lending, the
money o®ered in exchange for an amount of the good acts as a record, \proving" that
an agent o®ered credit during the previous period. Let qt denote the price of money














t ¸ 0; 8t
9
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: (2)
Here, mi
t is agent i's money holding in period t. A stationary Competitive Monetary
Equilibrium (CME) consists of an allocation together with a price of money, q, such
that the allocation solves each consumer's problem, and the markets for money and
the consumption good clear in each period. The following Proposition establishes the
existence of a CME when agents are su±ciently patient.




l), i = 1;2. There exists a stationary mone-
tary equilibrium in which an agent who holds money exchanges it for q units of the
consumption good in each period.
The proof of this Proposition is given in Appendix 1. It involves ensuring that
there exists a q such that obtaining one unit of money is pro¯table for the agent
with high endowment, while obtaining an additional unit of money is not. These
two conditions guarantee that the consumption allocation implied by the monetary
equilibrium is individually optimal. We remark that a non-monetary equilibrium in
8which agents do not accept money anticipating that the price of money in the future
will be zero always exists in our setup.
For an example, let u(¢) = log(¢), and let e1 = f2;1;2;1;:::g, and e2 = f1;2;1;2;:::g.
Assume that agent 2 is endowed with 1 indivisible unit of money at the beginning
of period 1. Provided that the discount factor is su±ciently high, q = 1
2 satis¯es the
conditions of Proposition 1. Therefore, a stationary CME allocation has each agent
consuming 11
2 for all t, i.e., one unit of money exchanges for 1
2 unit of the good in
each period. In this CME the agent with high endowment consumes ei
h ¡ q, and the
agent with low endowment consumes ei
l +q in all t. Clearly, this allocation is e±cient
for the economy under perfect recall. Interestingly, this stationary allocation cannot
be supported if money is perfectly divisible.
The above Proposition generalizes to the case where there is aggregate uncertainty





t+1jg ´ d > 0, where ® 2 (0; 1
2).

















Assumption 2 rules out the case where endowment °uctuations vanish over time
and the case where an agent has exactly the same endowment in two adjacent periods.
Assumption 3 requires that the discount factor is high enough to ensure the existence
of a (possibly not stationary) CME.
IV MONETARY INJECTIONS
In this section we explore the welfare implications of monetary injections. We still
assume that there are two (types of) agents. Agent (type) 1 has endowment sequence
fe1;e2;:::g, and agent (type) 2 has endowment sequence fe2;e1;:::g, with e1 > e2.
We will compare two environments. In environment 1 there is one indivisible unit
9of ¯at money. In environment 2 there are n > 1 indivisible units of ¯at money.
The two environments are otherwise identical. The CME to which we shall restrict
our attention is as described previously; i.e., the price of money stays constant over
time, and in each period the agent holding money uses his entire money balances to
purchase consumption goods. We have the following Proposition. The proof can be
found in Appendix 2.
Proposition 3 Any CME consumption allocation for environment 2 can be supported
as a CME consumption allocation for environment 1.
Intuitively, the environment with less money obtains a greater number of CME.
Furthermore, if money is perfectly divisible, the reverse is also true; i.e., any CME
allocation for the environment with less money can be supported as a CME allocation
for the environment with more money. Though an environment with fewer units of
money can support all the CME supportable in an environment with more money,
the welfare consequences are di±cult to evaluate because there is an equilibrium
allocation supportable in both environments that is not dominated by any other
equilibrium allocation. We next demonstrate that such an equilibrium allocation
exists. We have the following. See Appendix 2 for a proof.
Proposition 4 There exists a CME allocation that can be supported in both environ-
ments, and that is not Pareto dominated by any other CME outcome.
The above implies that monetary injections cannot be unambiguously evaluated
. Although the environment with fewer units of money supports more CME, both
environments support a Pareto e±cient outcome.
When money is perfectly divisible, the logic behind the above results can be used to
show that any CME allocation in environment 1 can be supported as a CME allocation
10in environment 2. However, when money is not perfectly divisible, a CME allocation
in environment 1 is not necessarily supported as a CME outcome in environment 2.











Here, mt is assumed to be a nonnegative integer for all t. In order for the equilibrium
allocation in the above program to be an equilibrium allocation in environment 2, it
has to be that the price in environment 2 is 1
n^ q and, therefore, the agent's problem






n^ qmt+1 + ct ￿ 1





Denoting ^ Mt = 1










This is the same as the earlier problem (A) except that we only need n ^ Mt to be a non-
negative integer. This allows for more choices than the nonnegative integer constraint
for mt in the original problem (A). Therefore, an optimal consumption choice for the
original problem (A) may no longer be optimal here. Intuitively, more money hold-
ings, and the resulting change in prices, allow for ¯ner{tuned trades among agents.
11V PERFECTLY DIVISIBLE MONEY
Here, we study a version of the model where money is perfectly divisible. The
environment is the same as in the previous section. Assume that agent 2 is endowed
with n perfectly divisible units of ¯at money in period 1. Although other CME exist,
we shall restrict attention to equilibria where agents use their entire money holdings
in order to make purchases in each period. This assumption is for simplicity. We
have the following Proposition. The proof can be found in Appendix 2.
Proposition 5 There exists a stationary CME in which consumption satis¯es el <
c¤
l < c¤






n . This allocation
is the best supportable allocation among those where agents use their entire money
holdings in order to make purchases in each period.
For an example, let eh = 3 and el = 1, and assume that ui(¢) = log(¢), for all i,
and ¯ = :9. Assume that there is one perfectly divisible unit of ¯at money: n = 1.
We can calculate that c¤
h = 2 2
19, c¤
l = 117
19, and q¤ = 17
19. Agent 1's equilibrium
consumption, c1, end-of-period money balances, m1, and discounted marginal utility
from consumption (DMU) in each period are given by the following.




















Notice that the agent's marginal utility of consumption is falling over time, so he
wants to consume more today. However, at the end of each even period his money
balance is zero, which prevents him from consuming more.
12VI DISCUSSION
Kocherlakota (1998) formalized the argument that, in a variety of models, incom-
plete memory is a necessary friction for money to be essential. We proposed a model
that incorporates no commitment and bounded recall within an otherwise standard
Walrasian setup. In the presence of a need for intertemporal trade, these were shown
to be su±cient for money to be essential.
Our work is related to several existing monetary models. Unlike the prototypical
random matching model, here there is an intertemporal lack of double coincidence
problem. In the presence of bounded recall, this problem cannot be overcome even
though agents meet in every period and trade in centralized markets. Our model can
be thought of as giving an alternative interpretation to that of Townsend (1980) for
the absence of private lending assumption in Bewley (1980). Of course, interpreting
the good index as indicating time is one of many possibilities. We could think of the
time index as a type index or a location index, etc. In the latter case, bounded recall
would restrict memory across locations instead of time periods.
In Appendix 1 we discuss how the individual rationality constraint can be derived
as a property of any equilibrium outcome of a game between agents with no recall of
the past and their future selves. One interpretation of the model we proposed is that
it is a model of bounded rational agents. Indeed, record-keeping and computability
costs that may result in imperfect recall of the past have been used as justi¯cation
for restricting the domain of the strategy space.8 It should also be emphasized that
while we concentrate on a Walrasian economy, our main points could be made within
a strategic model. Of course, with a large number of agents one would expect the
outcome of reasonable speci¯cations of the game to be close to the Walrasian outcome
studied here.
8See, for example, Cole and Kocherlakota (2000) and references within.
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16APPENDIX 1 - THE INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY CONSTRAINT
Here we discuss how the optimal behavior of agents when there is no recall about
past transactions gives rise to the IR constraint imposed in Section 2. We proceed by
introducing a suitable game and by arguing that in every equilibrium the individual
rationality constraints holds for all agents. Assume that there is one good in each
period and a large number of agents. We consider a game which, under perfect recall,
has an equilibrium that supports the (assumed to be) unique Walrasian equilibrium
allocation of the underlying intertemporal endowment economy. The game is similar
in spirit to the pure coordination game in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998). Here, in
addition to the actions of other agents, an agent has to consider his own actions in
the future, when he will not recall the past.
Let it denote the period t self of agent i. In each period t, player it chooses an







. Agent it also reports the value
(in units of the date t good) of his previous lending, b l
it
t¡1. The two announcements





t¡1 stand for the date t value of the





t stand for the total proposed









as well as the actions of the other players for all t, including the actions
of his future selves it+1;it+2;:::. Notice that each it is \altruistic" in the sense that
he values the (appropriately discounted) utility of all his future selves. His payo®
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In other words, loan repayment takes place in each period only if the total claim
from last period's lending matches the total repayment from last period's borrowing.
Similarly, current lending takes place only if the current demand for loans matches
current supply for loans. In addition, borrowing has to be feasible. We have the
following.








t¡1 ¸ 0, for all t. Thus, the constraint that u(ci
t) ¸ u(wi
t) , for all i and t is satis¯ed.
Furthermore, in all outcomes where the actions and beliefs of each agent constitute
part of a sequential equilibrium, each agent ends up in autarky.
The proof is straightforward and we omit it. We remark, however, that the game
has many sequential equilibria. For example, having all agents setting borrowing
and reported previous lending to in¯nity constitutes an equilibrium. However, in all
equilibria either the current lending and repayment will not realize or the amount of
lending and repayment is 0. So agents stay in autarky and u(ci
t) ¸ u(wi
t) is satis¯ed.
APPENDIX 2 - PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 2: For such an equilibrium to exist, we need that there exists







h ¡ q) + ¯u(e
1




h ¡ 2q) + ¯u(e
1
l + 2q) < u(e
1
h ¡ q) + ¯u(e
1
l + q): (10)
It su±ces to show that given such a q, it is optimal for both agents to follow the
scheme described in the Proposition. Then, market clearing follows. In turn, it
su±ces to show that in a given period, say period 1, agent 1 will exchange q units of
the good for a unit of money, and agent 2 will purchase q units of the good. There
are four cases to consider.
Case 1: Agent 1 demands less than one unit of money in period 1.




h. This, together with the
¯rst condition above and the concavity of u, implies u(e1
h) + ¯u(c1
2) ￿ u(e1
h ¡ q) +
¯u(c1
2 + q). Therefore, agent 1 can do better by saving one more unit of money in
period 1, saving one less unit of money in period 2, and starting period 3 with the
same money holdings.
Case 2: Agent 2 o®ers more than one unit of money in period 1.
This is impossible because agent 2 already uses up all his money holdings.
Case 3: Agent 1 demands more than 1 unit of money in period 1.
Then he saves at least two units of money in period 1. By the second condition above,
the cost of obtaining an additional unit of money satis¯es
¯[u(e
1
l + 2q) ¡ u(e
1
l + q)] < u(e
1
h ¡ q) ¡ u(e
1
h ¡ 2q): (11)
19Therefore, he would be better o® saving one less unit of money in period 1, using one
less unit of money in period 2, and starting period 3 with the same money holdings.
Thus, it has to be the case that m1
3 ¡ m1
2 ¸ ¡1. In addition, m1
4 ¡ m1





h ¡ q) ¡ u(e
1
h ¡ 2q)] < u(e
1
h ¡ q) ¡ u(e
1
h ¡ 2q): (12)
In that case, agent 1 would be better o® saving the extra unit of money in period 3
instead of period 1. Notice that his consumption is not a®ected because he did not
use all his money in period 2. Continuing this way, his sequence of net money savings
satis¯es m1
2 ¡ m1
1 ¸ 2, m1
3 ¡ m1
2 ¸ ¡1, m1
4 ¡ m1
3 ¸ 2, m1
5 ¡ m1
4 ¸ ¡1:::. But this is
not optimal since he is accumulating money without ever using it.
Case 4: Agent 2 o®ers less than one unit of money in period 1.
Similarly to case 3, we can show that he will end up accumulating money without
ever using it. We conclude that none of the above four possibilities is optimal. Since
each agent's problem is well de¯ned, an optimal choice has to exist, and the scheme
described in the Proposition is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we show that any CME consumption allocation
in the environment with more money is supportable in the environment with less
money. Consider the agent's problem in environment 2 when the equilibrium price











tgt be the resulting agent's equilibrium money holdings in environment 2. Note
that m¤
t is either 0 or n, for all t. Let fc¤
tgt be the agent's CME consumption sequence.
20We will construct an equilibrium for environment 1 in which fc¤
tgt is supported. Let
the price be q
0




















This is identical to the agent's problem in environment 2, except that when the
money is not perfectly divisible, there is an additional constraint that Mt is an integer
multiple of n for all t because, by de¯nition, Mt = nmt and mt is a nonnegative integer.
Since fm¤
tgt solves the agent's problem in environment 2 and satis¯es the additional
constraint (because m¤
t is either 0 or n), setting Mt = mt for all t solves the agent's
problem in environment 1. It follows that the equilibrium consumption sequence in
environment 1 coincides with that in environment 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: We demonstrate that there exists an equilibrium allocation
that is supportable in both environments and that is not dominated by any other
equilibrium consumption allocation. Let 0 < x < e1 be such that
u
0
(e1 ¡ x) = ¯u
0
(e2 + x): (16)
From our earlier discussion, both environments support the equilibrium in which an
agent with high endowment, e1, consumes e1 ¡x, and an agent with low endowment,
e2, consumes e2 + x in each period. This equilibrium outcome is not dominated
by any other equilibrium outcome since, for any x
0 6= x, the agent with endowment
fe1;e2;:::g is better o® consuming fe1¡x;e2+x;:::g rather than fe1¡x
0;e2+x
0;:::g.
21The following example gives an equilibrium consumption allocation supportable in
environment 1 but not in environment 2. Let e1 = 8, e2 = 1, and assume log utility
and ¯ = 0:5. In environment 1 (with one unit of money), let the price of money
be 1:5. Since log6:5 ¡ log5 = 0:114 ¸ 0:5(log4 ¡ log2:5) = 0:102, we have that
f6:5;2:5;6:5;2:5;:::g can be supported as a CME sequence for the agent beginning
with high endowment (e1 = 8). Next, we show that this sequence is not necessarily
supportable in environment 2. For this purpose, let n = 10 (there are 10 units of
money). In order to support the equilibrium where all the money balances change
hands in each period, the price of money has to be 1:5
10 = 0:15. However, log(8 ¡
0:15 £ 10) ¡ log(8 ¡ 0:15 £ 11) = 0:0101
< 0:5£log(1+0:15£11)¡log(1+0:15£10). Therefore, f6:5;2:5;6:5;2:5;:::g is
not supportable as a CME sequence in environment 2. For the best possible outcome,
the ¯rst order condition and the market clearing condition give x = 2. Therefore, in
that outcome an agent with high endowment consumes 6 units, and an agent with
low endowment consumes 3 units in each period.
Proof of Proposition 5: We consider a planner's problem and demonstrate that


























u0(el), we have that el < c¤
l < c¤
















parallels the one for the indivisible case. Again, it su±ces to consider period 1. We
consider the following four cases, which exhaust all possibilities.
Case 1: Agent 1 saves less.
Then he has less money and has to consume less in period 2, which is not optimal.
Case 2: Agent 2 saves less.
This is impossible because he is already using all his resources.
Case 3: Agent 1 saves more.
Then his marginal utility from consumption in period 1 is higher, which implies that
he will consume less than c¤
l in period 2. Then, he has a positive money balance at
the end of period 2. This positive balance implies that the agent is not in the corner
solution and will consume less than c¤
l in period 3 since, otherwise, he can do better
by using more money in period 2 and saving more in period 3. Therefore, agent 1
ends period 3 with a strictly increased money balance. Continuing this way, we can
show that agent 1 is accumulating money without using it, which cannot be optimal.
Case 4: Agent 2 saves more.
This means he does not use all his money holdings, which implies that he ends period
1 with a positive money balance. Now he is exactly in the situation of agent 1 in
case 3 above. The same argument as the one used there implies that he will end
up accumulating money without using it, which is not optimal. Since the agent's





h;:::g are optimal for agent 1 and 2,
respectively. The money market clearing follows from the choice of q¤.
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